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Federalism at the Crossroads: Old Meanings, 
New Significance
THOMAS HUEGLIN Wilfrid Laurier University
Our understanding of federalism as a concept of political organization is
commonly derived from its practice in a handful of classical federal
states. In particular, and with good historical reason, it is the United
States that serves as the main point of reference. All other federal sys-
tems are, to a considerable extent, seen and judged as variations of the
American model. Its central tenets are the sanctity of constitutional rule,
the historical victory of federal supremacy over states rights, territorial
jurisdiction and representation and a division of powers distinguishing
between what is perceived as national and regional policy domains (the
literature on comparative federalism remains thin; see Elazar, 1987;
Watts, 1999).
On all counts, federalism has remained a contested concept. Consti-
tutional rigidity is giving way to the greater flexibility of negotiated agree-
ments or treaties. Accordingly, the relationship between federal and
regional governments is taking on more balanced or even confederal char-
acteristics. Territorial jurisdiction and representation are challenged by the
rise of transborder and identity politics. The boundaries of national and
regional policy domains are increasingly blurred by forces of economic
globalization (Hueglin, 2000).
The theorists and practitioners of federalism are reluctant to endorse
such changes to the classical model. They can rightly point to a powerful
tradition and proven track record in modern federal states. Both are epito-
mized by the American model and its seemingly timeless constitutional
commentary in the Federalist Papers (Hamilton and Jay et al.). Written as
newspaper commentaries by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James
Madison in 1787-1788 in order to bring about ratification of the American
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constitution in the state of New York, these essays doubtlessly comprise
the very essence of the modern federal state in theory and practice.
As is well enough known, the Federalists drew from an older Euro-
pean tradition. Their most obvious source of inspiration was Mon-
tesquieu’s idea of a “Confederate Republic” in The Spirit of Laws (1750).1
Montesquieu had derived this idea from contemporaneous examples of
federated governance in Switzerland, Germany, or what was then called
the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and the Netherlands.
Already a century earlier, and based on the same historical examples,
Johannes Althusius had developed a grand theory of covenanted or conso-
ciational federalism (1614). There is no evidence that the Americans had
read or known Althusius, although he published the second edition of his
book in the Netherlands at a time when some of the English “pilgrim
fathers” had stayed there in exile (Hueglin, 1999: 16; on possible connec-
tions between Althusius and Montesquieu, see ibid: 110). However, it is
clear that the Protestant spirit of covenanted union played a central role in
the political thought of the New England colonies.
Against the view that the dominant American model of the federal
state gradually evolved from these older traditions (Elazar, 1994: 111-32),
an argument can be made that the Federalists’ interpretation constituted a
deliberate and radical break with that tradition. This may already be evi-
denced by the fact that their account of the three very same historical
examples, in the nineteenth and twentieth Federalist Papers, is entirely
negative. The reason given is the same in each instance: the lack of
supreme central authority in these confederacies leads to “imbecility” in
government and social affairs.
A careful comparative re-reading of the Federalists against the older
tradition embodied by Montesquieu and Althusius establishes the meaning
of this turning point in the history of federalist thought more clearly. While
the Federalists endorsed federal supremacy over the states, Montesquieu and
Althusius insisted on a balance of power ultimately tilted in favour of the
constituent members of a federation. While the Federalists sought to employ
territorial divisions of power as a means of cutting across social community
and class, Montesquieu and Althusius understood it as a means of reinforc-
ing the stability of such communities.  And while the Federalists based their
arguments on a hierarchical differentiation of national and local policy
needs, Montesquieu and Althusius emphasized that smaller communities
would remain fully functioning polities in their own right.
This re-examination of a crucial turning point in the history of feder-
alist thought also points out that the older understanding of federalism is
remarkably in tune with critiques of the federal state as overly statist, top-
heavy in the presumption of federal supremacy, territorially biased and
insensitive to the self-governing claims of social communities, and ineffi-
cient in its anachronistic allocation of powers. The new significance of that
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Abstract. Federalism has remained a contested concept. The constitutional certainties of
the modern federal state are under attack from confederal practices of negotiated agreement.
Such practices have their traditional roots in the political theories of Althusius and Mon-
tesquieu. The central argument of this article is that the American Federalists broke with that
older tradition and deliberately misinterpreted Montesquieu along the way. Consequently,
the predominant reading of federalism emphasizes federal supremacy over the idea of a
social compact among equal partners, territorial representation dominates over the recogni-
tion of social community, and the allocation of divided powers is guided by national pre-
rogatives rather than regionally differentiated policy needs. Recent trends towards a more
collaborative form of federalism indicate that the old model of constitutional federalism may
be replaced by new practices of treaty federalism.
Résumé. Le concept de fédéralisme demeure contesté. Les certitudes constitutionnelles de
l’État fédéral moderne sont remises en question par les pratiques confédérales de négocia-
tions d’ententes. De telles pratiques plongent leurs racines dans les théories politiques
d’Althusius et de Montesquieu. L’argument central de cet article est que les fédéralistes
américains ont rompu avec cette vieille tradition et ont ainsi mal interprété Montesquieu de
façon délibérée. En conséquence, la lecture dominante du fédéralisme met l’accent sur la
suprématie fédérale au détriment de l’idée du contrat social établi entre des partenaires
égaux, de même que sur la représentation territoriale au détriment de la reconnaissance de
la communauté sociale. La séparation des pouvoirs est faite en fonction d’impératifs
nationaux au lieu de tenir compte des besoins politiques distinctifs des différentes régions.
Les tendances récentes conduisant à une forme de fédéralisme plus axée sur la collaboration
indiquent que l’ancien modèle du fédéralisme constitutionnel peut être remplacé par les
nouvelles pratiques découlant du fédéralisme de traité.
older tradition in a globalizing world of national fragmentation and inter-
national integration will be discussed briefly in the concluding section.
However, the exercise begins with some methodological reminiscences on
the bifurcation of statist and societal political thought at the beginning of
the modern epoch.
1. Methodological Beginnings: The Statist versus Societal 
Perspective of Politics
At the beginning of the modern epoch which brought forth the territo-
rial nation state and, somewhat later, the federal state as its only signif-
icant variation, a French logician, Pierre de la Ramée (1515-1572),
burst upon the scholarly scene with a masters thesis claiming that
“whatever has been said by Aristotle, was wrong” (“quaecumque ab
Aristotele dicta essent, commentitia esse”; see McRae, 1955: 306). It
has been pointed out that this youthful and exuberant attack was really
more directed against the scholasticizing distortions of Aristotelian
thought at the time than against Aristotle himself. Ramée, who was first
banned from teaching logic and philosophy altogether and then, rein-
stated, held a prestigious chair at the Collège Royal, perished in the
St. Bartholomew Day massacre of 1572. He had an enormous influence
upon two political theorists who would play a significant role in the
debates shaping the modern world.
One of these theorists was Jean Bodin who gave that world the first
definition of sovereignty as puissance absolue & perpetuelle (1576). The
other was Johannes Althusius who held against Bodin that the right of sov-
ereignty is “neither supreme and perpetual, nor above the law” (“non…est
summa potestas, non perpetua neque lega soluta”; 1614: XI.21). In the
Westphalian peace treaty negotiations of 1648 that ultimately sealed the
fate of the Holy Roman Empire by bringing forth the modern state system,
the imperial camp would routinely invoke Bodin in order to lay claim to
the Emperor’s exclusive right of representation, while the anti-imperial
camp took recourse to Althusius in its successful quest of having the
estates included as territorial representatives in their own right (Hoke,
1998). While Althusius was soon forgotten, Bodin’s doctrine of sover-
eignty lived on as supreme law within the absolutist territorial states that
emerged from the renunciation of imperial supremacy.
Both Bodin and Althusius based their claims on Ramist logic, a sim-
ple set of principles for the systematic discovery of knowledge (Hueglin,
1999: chapter 6). According to this logic, all scientific discourse has to be
based on invention, the search for the right kind of arguments for each
given subject matter, and disposition or judgment, the skilful ordering of
these arguments in order to reach logical conclusions. The latter, disposi-
tion, means that all social phenomena have to be presented in a
dichotomizing  scheme of subdivisions ranging from the most general to
the most particular. The former, invention, is itself subdivided into three
further principles. The first, which is called the law of justice, determines
the proper boundaries of a given discipline, and requires that all alien
arguments be excluded. The second principle, or law of truth, requires a
focus on universal and necessary precepts, and the elimination of all
propositions that are only true in certain places and times. The third prin-
ciple, or law of wisdom, commands that all propositions or arguments
must be placed within a specific level of generality and should not be con-
fused with matters on a higher or lower level of generality (Carney, 1995;
McRae, 1955). 
Bodin and Althusius both define as the subject matter of politics the
rights of sovereignty in a commonwealth composed of households and
other intermediate social organizations. They both follow the Ramist
method of subdividing the plurality of social phenomena into various
classes ranging from the general to the particular, although this is less evi-
dent in Bodin’s République than in Althusius’ Politica (McRae, 1955:
315). They both begin their discussion of politics with family and house-
hold as the natural and timeless beginning of social life. By declaring the
establishment of sovereign rule as the ultimate end of social organization,
however, Bodin subordinates these households and other intermediate
social organizations to a status that is functionally dependent on that end.
Here is where Althusius begs to differ.
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Precisely because families constitute the natural beginning of social
life, he insists, they are governed by special sets of rules specific to them,
and not by a general rule of sovereignty. The same principle of specificity
also applies to all communities or, as he calls them, consociations, villages,
cities and provinces which all precede realms or states and are prior to
them “just as the simple or primary precedes in order what has been com-
posed or derived from it” (“eoque notior est & simplex, seu primum id
quid compositum seu ortum a primo est, antecedit ordine”; Althusius,
1995). This then leads him to reject “Bodin’s clamours” (“non curo Bod-
ini clamores”; Friedrich, 1932: Praefatio 1603) that the rights of sover-
eignty as the ultimate end must be exclusively located in the highest order
of governance. Instead it follows logically that their ownership belongs to
“none other than the entire people consociated from several smaller conso-
ciations in one symbiotic body” (“nullum alium, quam populum univer-
sum, in corpus unum symbioticum ex pluribus minoribus consociationibus
consociatum”; Althusius, 1614: Praefatio). 
Althusius further explains why Bodin and others reach different con-
clusions. They try to determine the nature of sovereignty before examin-
ing social life in cities and provinces and thus deduce, erroneously, the
nature of the latter with the help of principles that are not on the same level
of generality. This “conflicts with the law of method” (“pugnat enim hoc
cum lege methodi”; 1614: XXXIX.84). Put differently, the difference in
method is that Bodin first determines the most general principle of politics,
sovereignty, and then deduces from it the nature of organized social life,
whereas Althusius first examines the nature of organized social life and
then determines sovereignty as its most general principle—by means of
induction rather than deduction. In the first case, the quality and organiza-
tion of social life become dependent variables of sovereign rule. In the sec-
ond case, sovereignty appears as a dependent variable of the nature and
organization of social life.
The implications for political theory are considerable. Bodin falls into
a tradition that defines politics predominantly, if not exclusively, as a hier-
archical system of organized public power. All social rights and obliga-
tions stem from one universal source of legal authority. Althusius, by con-
trast, represents a tradition that defines politics in a much wider sense. For
him it is primarily a horizontal process of communication among a plural-
ity of groups or communities which all possess their own rights and obli-
gations. Sovereignty as the communication of universal right is the end
product of that process, not the starting point. 
The implications for federalism are equally significant. From the Bod-
inian perspective of the sovereign state, federalism inevitably must take on
the form of the modern federal state: the law of the federation ultimately
breaks the laws of its member units. Primacy is given to the efficiency
requirements of nation-state governance. From the Althusian perspective, on
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the other hand, federalism is a balancing act among equals, confederal rather
than federal because “every constituting body is prior and superior to what
is constituted by it” (“omnis constituens prior & superior est a se contituto”;
1614: XVIII.8). Sovereignty, therefore, is not a constitutional certitude that
determines who gets to do what in a federation. In fact, it only exists when
the process of shared governance works and all agree. Federal sovereignty
in the Althusian sense is a process of negotiated and shared sovereignty.
2. The Issue of Supremacy: Assemblage of Societies versus 
Perfect Subordination
It is in the ninth Federalist Paper that Alexander Hamilton most exten-
sively refers to Montesquieu’s “Confederate Republic.” After quoting at
length from the ninth book of The Spirit of Laws, calling it a “luminous
abridgment of the principal argument in favour of the Union,” he goes on
to tell his readers what his vision of a confederate republic is:
The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be “an assemblage
of societies,” or an association of two or more states into one state. The
extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere matters
of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members not be
abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local pur-
poses; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority
of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states,
or a confederacy. (Emphasis in original.)
This is as subtle and brilliant an act of theoretical subterfuge as James
Madison’s, much more well known and debated in the next and tenth Fed-
eralist Paper, where the frustration of majority rule is presented as repub-
lican virtue (Harrington, 1990: 5-6, 67). Hamilton’s move, a mere matter
of “discretion” as it were, from “an assemblage of societies” to “perfect
subordination” was a deliberate transformation of the federal principle that
had been developed by Montesquieu, and by Althusius before him, as a
prestatist concept of societal organization.
At the beginning of the modern age, the question of supreme author-
ity had to be posed anew. Renaissance and humanism had begun to chal-
lenge the static medieval world of predestination and redemption. The
Reformation had destroyed the old world of Christian universality in
which the question of supremacy, at least in principle, had been left to the
rivalries between Pope and Emperor, and to a plurality of overlapping
spheres of rule in practice. As a result, a new world emerged that was ever
more drawn into religious and civil war. Political theory responded with
two solutions. One, represented by a line from Machiavelli to Bodin and
Hobbes, aimed at the re-establishment of unity. The other can be discerned
in what has been called the Calvinist rediscovery of political complexity
(Wolin, 1957). Its main protagonist was Althusius.
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Since he saw the social foundations of mixed republican rule
destroyed by corruption in Italy, Machiavelli placed supremacy in the hand
of “a new prince” (“uno nuovo principe”; Machiavelli, 1513: XXVI;
Hueglin, 1990) who, ignoring all tradition, would be guided in his actions
by “the factual truth of the matter” (“verità effettuale della cosa”; Machi-
avelli, 1513: XV) alone. A century and a half later in France, Bodin very
much sought to retain tradition by basing his own explanation for the
establishment of sovereignty on a historical theory of conquest (1576: II.2)
by which, at least initially, “lordly” (seigneuriales) monarchies had been
set up. These were eventually transformed into “royal” (légitimes) monar-
chies, foregoing some of their original lordly rights by bestowing them—
as privileges—upon their subjects (Hinton, 1973: 310-12). Almost a cen-
tury later again, in England, that tradition was dissipating rapidly in the
Civil War. In order to re-establish stability, Hobbes called for the collec-
tive surrender of all individual wills which were to be conferred, in a fic-
titious social contract: “upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men,”
and, lastly, “unto one Will” (Hobbes, 1651: XVII). 
For Althusius, politics is the art of consociation (“proposita igitur
Politicae est consociatio”; 1614: I.2), a process of community-building,
and of establishing and maintaining a stable and lawful relationship
among many narrower and wider such consociations or communities,
from families, guilds and professional colleges, to cities, provinces and
the universal commonwealth (Hueglin, 1999: chapter 8). He has no
problem in recognizing that, in a new age of social upheaval, sover-
eignty must be indivisible, that there must be, in other words, a supreme
law of the land, covering all aspects of organized social life. But he
denies vigorously that such a law can be beyond the control of those to
whom it applies. Hence he holds against Bodin that the right of sover-
eignty is “neither supreme and perpetual,  nor above the law” (Hueglin,
1999: chapter 8, footnote 10). Its sole source is “none other than the
entirety of the people consociated in one symbiotic body from many
smaller consociations” (“nullum alium, quam populum universum, in
corpus unum symbioticum ex pluribus minoribus consociationibus
consociatum”; 1614: Praefatio). In other words, politics for Althusius is
the organization of social and territorial complexity, and sovereignty is
shared sovereignty:
[Only] the people or consociated members of the realm have the power of
establishing this right of the realm and of binding themselves to it. [It] does
not belong to individual members, but to all members jointly. [By] common
consent, they are able to establish and set in order matters pertaining to it.
And what they have once set in order is to be maintained and followed,
unless something else pleases the common will. For as the whole body is
related to the individual citizen, and can rule, restrain and direct each mem-
ber, so the people rules each citizen.2
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The conceptual basis for this process of shared sovereignty is a social
compact theory. There is no fictitious act of individual or collective sur-
render, nor the establishment of unquestioned supremacy. In fact, Althu-
sius states unequivocally that at the universal councils of the realm “the
opinion of the combined orders and estates prevails over the opinion of the
presiding officer or the supreme magistrate” (“sentential igitur universo-
rum statuum & ordinuum praevalet paesidis seu summi magistrates sen-
tentiae”; 1614: XXXIII.20). This supreme magistrate holds “supreme”
powers only insofar as he has a governing mandate. He is not part of the
original social compact.
A compact theory of federalism does not preclude stable political
union but is committed to the preservation of a plurality of particular iden-
tities. In fact, that preservation is the primary purpose of union. All
through the Middle Ages, such plurality had existed. In principle, the
Empire, its kingdoms, principalities, duchies, bishoprics and free cities all
were to govern autonomously within their respective spheres of jurisdic-
tion and privilege. In practice, overlapping spheres of authority and rule
often had exposed citizens to near anarchical conditions (Bull, 1977).
Althusius’ theory intended to provide a solution to this problem by estab-
lishing a unifying process of common governance without, however,
destroying the plurality of communities itself. “[The rationale of universal
governance is that] the highest concern must be had for the fundamental
law of the realm…which is nothing other than those pacts [or covenants]
by which many cities and provinces come together and agree to establish
and defend one and the same commonwealth by common work, counsel,
and aid.”3 Rather than directing the commonwealth from a position of
supremacy, therefore, the federal level of government assumes the role of
a forum in which the constituent members of a federation agree on uni-
versal standards and norms. Its role is, in other words, to do what these
members alone cannot do by providing internal cohesion and external
security. The immediate question is, of course, why these constituent
members would ever come to such an understanding and agreement of sol-
idarity. It has always been the suspicion of radical democratic discourse
that federalism balkanizes the general will and facilitates local tyrannies
(Lowi, 1984). The Althusian perspective, however, points to three possible
answers. 
The first of these has to do with adequate structuration. Citizens will
act reasonably and responsibly when they can see the consequences of
their actions. This appears likely when the gap between the reach of indi-
vidual responsibility and large political organizations can be bridged by
intermediate structures, thus allowing for meaningful participation, linking
particular concerns to particular structures of governance, and leaving to
the large structures the general concerns that affect all in the same way. A
second answer points to politics as deliberation. Without federal
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supremacy, the constituent members of the commonwealth are held to
engage in a process of “mutual communication of whatever is useful and
necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life” (“ad communica-
tionem mutuam eorum, quae ad vitae socialis usum & consortium sunt
utilia & necessaria, se obligant”; 1614: I.2). Adequate structuration and
representation4 are the preconditions for this process. 
Finally, the third answer points to faith in human nature; provided
with appropriate institutions, humans will act responsibly. This is simply a
more optimistic and Aristotelian view of human sociability than the
Hobbesian assumption of man as man’s wolf.
Montesquieu’s argument a century and a half after Althusius is quite
similar. In the famous sixth chapter of the eleventh book of The Spirit of
Laws, he advances the thought that the value of proper representative gov-
ernment lies in its capability of “discussing affairs.” Proper representation
requires that representatives are elected by the inhabitants of particular
places rather than chosen from the “general body of the nation,” because
“the inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its
wants and interests.” This can only exist in a “free state” where, as Mon-
tesquieu has already established earlier, “by the very disposition of things
power should be a check to power” (1750: XI.4). Such a free state can only
be a small republic. A large one would have to be held together by the
supreme force of a monarchical government, an “internal imperfection,”
by which its freedom would be ruined. However, by the same token, a
small republic would require protection from a strong monarchical gov-
ernment because otherwise it would be “destroyed by a foreign force”
(1750: IX.1).
This is how Montesquieu arrives at the idea of a “confederate repub-
lic.” Such a republic, as an “assemblage of societies” constituting a new
one, would combine “the internal advantages of a republican, together
with the external force of a monarchical, government” (1750: IX.1). The
locus of these passages, however, is the first chapter of the ninth book
where Montesquieu discusses external defence and security,5 not the sixth
chapter of the eleventh book where he turns to the separation of powers in
a free state. The federal union, therefore, is not meant to affect the full
internal exercise of these powers by the members of such a union. There is
simply no way of reading into these passages what Hamilton read into
them, namely that the members of such a union will continue to exist for
“local purposes” only—because local is not the same as internal, and that
they “should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the
union”—because that authority is limited to external security.
Hamilton and his Federalist colleagues sought to convince their read-
ers of the necessity of a strong union government for external as well as
internal purposes because the preceding confederacy had proven unable to
provide economic stability. That was as valid an argument then as it is
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now. It could have been made, and can be made, by extending Mon-
tesquieu’s limited understanding of security. Internal peace, order and
good government, for instance, including the regulation of trade and com-
merce, may well be prerequisites for security in a more general sense. But
it violates Montesquieu’s spirit of laws to construct from it the assumption
of supremacy.
3. The Issue of Representation: Territorial versus Social Community
In the fifty-first Federalist Paper, the concern is with the representation of
minority rights. As Madison had already made clear in the tenth Federal-
ist, the purpose is protection of private property. The means to this end is
now identified more precisely as “a judicious modification and mixture of
the federal principle.… In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided by two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments.” Through this balkanization of the popular will, the Federal-
ists argue, “the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests
and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority,
will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”
The point here is not a critique of this early pre-formulation of the
American doctrine of liberal pluralism and polyarchy. That critique has
been made, pointing out the “circularity in polyarchy” (Lindblom, 1977:
chapter 15; Manley, 1983) under conditions of social inequality which the
Federalists took for granted and wanted to preserve. The point is that fed-
eralism as a form of power separation is employed as a constraining device
cutting across social community, as the deliberate organization of bias
(Schattschneider, 1960: 71) on the basis of territory, cutting across organ-
ized societal interests.
The merits or demerits of territorial federalism may well be debat-
able. But it cannot be claimed that the organization of territorial federal-
ism thus established has its intellectual roots in Montesquieu. However,
this is what Hamilton claims when he writes, in the ninth Federalist
Paper again, that Montesquieu “explicitly treats of a Confederate Repub-
lic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government.” As
we already know, this is not at all what Montesquieu suggests. For him,
the confederate option of territorial expansion is an external security
device, and its purpose and design are precisely meant to preserve a
republican form of mixed governance within the smaller constituent
members of a confederation, balancing, as it were, the interests of dif-
ferent social communities through power separation as well as mutual
checks and balances. The territorial principle of federalism, in other
words, is treated as an expedient, reinforcing rather than cutting across
social community. 
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The earlier federal theory of Althusius not only follows a similar
logic but extends it to an elaborate scheme of political organization. A
well-ordered polity, he argues, is politically structured as an ascending
order, from smaller communities or consociations with more particular
needs and interests, to a large commonwealth serving universal needs. In
what might be called a system of consecutive federalization, each larger
consociation is governed by a council of representatives from the smaller
consociations it comprises, and by a presiding officer generally elected by
that council. There is no direct parliamentary representation of individual
citizens. In modern terms, the federal commonwealth resembles a multi-
level system of governance by second chambers. 
Thus the interests of families and clans are represented in guilds and
professional colleges. Representatives of these organized interests sit in
city councils. Cities and rural districts, in turn, are represented in provin-
cial assemblies. Finally, the estates of the realm, nobility, clergy and cities,
sit and deliberate in separate chambers or benches at the universal assem-
bly or councils of the realm (Althusius, 1614). The entire commonwealth
is thus constructed as an ascending chain of indirect or council representa-
tion.6 Decisions at each level of federation or consociation are generally
taken on the basis of mutual agreement. This consent requirement protects
each consociation in its autonomous rights of self-determination.  A major-
ity, Althusius affirms, can only decide in matters “that concern all orders
alike, but not what concerns them separately” (“quae simul universos
ordines concernunt, non quae seorsim singulos”; 1614: VIII, 68-70). 
The central issue is representative inclusion. For Althusius the repre-
sentation of all societal interests is a matter of principle.7 In modern terms,
again, all politics is identity politics. Governance at the level of a province,
for example, is based on agreement and compromise among the estates of
the land. These include clergy, nobility, cities and rural areas. All are repre-
sented as distinct communities in provincial councils (1614: VIII). By com-
parison, the Federalists denounce the “actual representation” of all societal
interests as “altogether visionary.” They concede that “all classes of citi-
zens” should have some representation so that “their feelings and interests
may be the better understood,” but in an almost pre-Althusian feudal sense,
they insist that in general “landholders, merchants and men of the learned
professions” will know what is best for all (35th Federalist [Hamilton]).
It needs to be emphasized that the point here is not to cast moral or
political judgment on any of these authors. While they all defended the
vested interests of the social classes they belonged to, they all went beyond
the limitations of narrow partisanship and therefore deserve their places in
the history of political thought. 
The Federalists very much sought to constrain popular majority
power by checks and balances which, nevertheless, were meant to safe-
guard the political process from the corruptions of vested interests in a
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more general way. In this, they indeed learned from Montesquieu for
whom federalism meant the provision of an external security shield behind
which the traditional classes could engage in a stable game of republican
politics. That constituted progress in political thinking because it advo-
cated a form of “political liberty” by giving a representative voice to the
“whole body of the people”—even though, as he wrote at the end of the
chapter on the Constitution of England (1750: XI.6), he would rather not
inquire whether this liberty was “actual” or merely formal. Althusius, in
turn, stubbornly defended the interests of those to whom he owed his rise
from humble peasant origin to respected law professor, Reformed church
elder and influential city politician (Hueglin, 1999: 32-37). Yet with
methodological thoroughness, he formulated general principles of repre-
sentative inclusion that went far beyond such self-interest.
The point, then, is not to cast judgment but to contrast the substantive
differences in these efforts at conceptualizing an inclusive theory of poli-
tics. The Federalists’ “judicious” territorialization of the popular will was
already steeped in Lockean individual liberalism. At least in the postbellum
American republic, when common diction replaced “the United States are”
with “the United States is,” federalism increasingly came to be seen as a
safeguard of individual rights, not social communities. For Montesquieu
and Althusius, on the other hand, territory and social community still
formed an inseparable unit. Representation of the general will therefore
meant representation of these communities. Federalism was conceptualized
as a safeguard of these communities in a community of communities.
4. The Issue of Power Allocation: Policy Fields versus Policy Needs 
The modern federal state was in most instances based on elite compromise
among economic modernizers and cultural traditionalists,8 without, how-
ever, losing sight of the fact that this cultural traditionalism also went hand
in hand with the preservation of economic interests. At the Philadelphia
Convention of 1787, the essential compromise was the one between north-
ern interests in trade and commerce and southern interests in retaining that
“peculiar institution,” slavery, upon which the privileges of the plantation
owners rested (Hofstadter and Miller et al., 1973: 68-69). The compromise
was not a durable one, and it was only settled, in favour of federal
supremacy, a century later in the Civil War. In Switzerland, on the other
hand, the constitution of 1848 was preceded by a secessionist war. The out-
come was a compromise between the modernizing liberal and the catholic-
conservative cantons (im Hof, 1968: 61). At Versailles, in 1871, Bismarck’s
federal state was forged upon a compromise between the dynastic interests
aligned with Prussian industrial nationalism and the alliance of southern
fairy tale princes led by Bavaria’s Ludwig II (Mann, 1958: 377). And in
Canada, the constitutional outcome of 1867, even though based on one of
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the “most curious alliances ever forged in Canadian politics” (Vipond,
1991: 16), nevertheless came down to a basic compromise between John A.
Macdonald’s transcontinental economic railway union and the retention of
“property and civil rights” in Quebec (Morton, 1983: 71-79).
A general pattern of power distribution by policy fields evolved, cen-
tralizing trade and commerce at the national level while leaving culture,
education and social policy at the subnational level. Soon this became a
problem for modernizing and democratizing societies. Federal trade and
commerce policies created or reinforced patterns of uneven regional devel-
opment. Overburdened with social policy problems, regional governments
became dependent on federal transfers. Fiscal revenue was increasingly
spent by governments which did not have the capacity to raise it. Fiscal
distribution and transfer schemes became the main preoccupation of fed-
eral systems. The original separation of powers became blurred, by politi-
cal interlocking—as in the German system—by the wild growth of a
mostly conditional federal grants system—as in the United States—or by
a quasi-diplomatic regime of intergovernmental relations behind closed
doors—as in Canada (Watts, 1999). 
The question to be raised here is not whether modern federalism has
become inefficient due to a decision-making process trapped in overlap-
ping lines of authority (the classical locus of this argument is Scharpf,
1988). Once more, it is about a disjuncture in the history and tradition of
federalism as a system of divided governance, and once again we return to
the ninth Federalist Paper, in which Hamilton had told his readers that the
purpose of such a division of powers was to separate the “general author-
ity of the union” from governance for “local purposes.” Such governance
would be sustained, he extended further, by leaving to the states “certain
exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.” In light of the
actual constitutional document and its judicial interpretation over time, this
passage indicates that the Federalists intended to bring about a radical
departure from the older and traditional understanding of allocating pow-
ers among a plurality of political communities. 
For the Americans, the federalist compromise meant the distinction of
different classes of political community with different sets of powers
required to maintain them. This exclusive allocation of powers was to be
laid down with constitutional certitude and to be changed only exception-
ally and with extreme procedural caution. Moreover, once established, the
allocation of powers among the two levels no longer was to be negotiable.
Changing policy needs would lead American federalism to a rights-based
battleground of competing judicial interpretation. 
For an appreciation of the older tradition of power allocation among
plural political communities, we return once more to the federal theory
of Althusius. Althusius was as much concerned with compromise as
were the American framers. While he sought to preserve the local
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autonomies of cities and other subnational units against the rising tide of
territorial absolutism, he was very much aware of the fact that these now
had to operate in a new context of Europeanized socio-economic rela-
tions. He recognized, in other words, a development that had begun to
transform the “merchandising politics of cities” into the “monetary poli-
tics of states” (Sombart, 1928: 366). Guilds and professional colleges
could no longer rely on insulated protection in local market places. The
traditional nexus of social and regional identity had begun to weaken.
The question, very much, was who should get to do and decide what in
a new era of territorialized complexity.
Althusius thought of all political communities or consociations as
generically alike. The purpose of each is the “mutual communication of
goods, services and rights” (“communicatio mutual…rebus, operis,
juribus”; 1614: I.7). Each is to be organized as a common social enterprise,
including all essential cultural, economic and political activities necessary
for the organization of a prosperous and just social life. The question, then,
is not which functions, economic, social, and so on, should be allocated at
what level, but which economic, social, and other functions should be allo-
cated at what level. 
From the perspective of the modern federal state, Althusius’ scheme
of power allocation looks like a concurrent intergovernmental nightmare.
For provinces and the universal commonwealth, for instance, he provided
very similar lists of enumerated public policy powers. Both include, in
varying formulations, similar matters of public order and security, levying
of duties and public spending, the promotion of commerce, use of lan-
guage and money and a general clause pertaining to the public good (1614:
VII.12, XI.4). But then he does provide a normative or conceptual yard-
stick for how to cut through the maze. Borrowing from an old and vener-
able formula of Roman Law, he established as the most general rule for the
process of decision making that “what touches upon all, must be agreed by
all.”9 This is not just expression of a general consent requirement. It means
that a particular community should retain veto power (operationalized by
a consent requirement) and self-regulatory autonomy in matters affecting
it in a particular or unequal way, whereas common decisions (allowing
majority voting) are possible in matters pertaining to all communities
equally or in the same way.
In sharp contrast to the rights-based construction of modern constitu-
tional federalism, the Althusian commonwealth was meant to rely on
negotiated compromise over the extent to which each political community
would be autonomous in governing its own affairs. The rationale of con-
stitutionality in the Althusian sense is not to settle the question about who
has the right to do what. It is to provide procedural principles that are
meant to answer questions about who should best do what, and to what
extent, in order to ensure the fairest outcome for all. 
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5. Speculative Endings: Constitutional versus Treaty Federalism
The American Federalists wanted to invent a new form of government. They
wanted to break away from the British unitary form of state that had failed
to give adequate recognition to their particular colonial interests. They also
wanted to overcome the institutional defects of the preceding Confederation
that had been plagued with political and economic instability. Madison in
particular was convinced that the historical precedents he had studied, such
as the United Netherlands in particular, only offered “warning of the course
to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued” (37th
Federalist). The constitutional outcome that he and his colleagues defended
so vigorously, while retaining the idea of divided government as a safeguard
against tyranny, was to do away with what he saw as the “notorious vices”
of factious “councils and consultations.” For that reason exactly the new
constitution had been designed so that political organization would cut
across social community, and so that it would be understood as a “final act”
no longer permitting “new experiments” (ibid). 
In historical terms, the American model shut the door to the older tra-
dition exemplified by Montesquieu and Althusius. The constitutional model
of territorialized rights protection replaced the idea of federalism as a form
of ongoing deliberation and negotiated compromise. The original covenant
or compact that is still celebrated as the heart and soul of American federal-
ism (Elazar, 1994) eventually became as fictitious in constitutional practice
as the Hobbesian social contract had been in theory. Within the confines of
constitutional rights litigation,10 only a sense of political pragmatism and the
necessity of co-operative intergovernmental relations has kept it alive.
Elsewhere, older notions of a compact or treaty theory of federalism
did not disappear so easily and thoroughly. In Bismarck’s federal Empire,
for instance, the Bavarian constitutional lawyer Max von Seydel, taking
recourse to the secessionist theories of John Calhoun, gave expression to
the confederalist view that the Empire had been created by a treaty among
sovereign states, and that this state of affairs was evidenced by the diplo-
matic relationship between Empire and states (Lehmbruch, 2000: 62). As
a constitutional convention, the principle of “amicable federal-state behav-
iour”(Lehmbruch, 2000: 63) lived on in the new German federalism after
1949. Moreover, and as in the Bismarck constitution, the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic also gave to the Länder governments an important and
direct voice in federal legislation.11
In Canada, provincial “autonomists” had also insisted soon after Con-
federation that the new constitution “should be understood as a ‘contract’
among the several provinces.” The issue here was the removal of the fed-
eral government’s power of “disallowance,” the right to void provincial leg-
islation. The autonomists argued that the provinces, as the contractees of the
constitution, had a right to bring about a constitutional amendment to this
effect without the federal government’s consent (Vipond, 1991: 137). 
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As in the German case, the compact theory of federalism did not gain
legal ground in Canada. Yet the federal power of disallowance has not
been used since 1943 and, as in Germany, considerable ambiguity about
the constitutional nature of federalism has remained. In his refutation of
Seydel’s position, Rudolf Smend, one of Germany’s leading constitu-
tional scholars, wrote in 1916: “In terms of constitutional law [his]
description of the relationship between Empire and Länder could not be
more mistaken. In terms of political convention, it could not be more
accurate” (Lehmbruch, 2000: 62). It is almost breathtaking how this view
was echoed, in another country and 65 years later, when the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled, in its decision concerning provincial approval to
constitutional amendments, that “a substantial degree of provincial con-
sent” was a political convention required by the constitution but, at the
same time, that adherence to this convention was not “legally required”
(Russell, 1982: 501-74).
It is this admission of ambiguity, between federalism as a legal con-
struction and a political system of negotiated agreement,  that warrants
speculation on how the balance between the constitutional and the treaty
dimension of federalism might shift in the twenty-first century. Indeed,
this essay started with the assertion that constitutional federalism fash-
ioned upon the American model may have outlived its usefulness in an
age of flexible territorial relations, identity politics and economic glob-
alization. Evidence supporting this assertion appears on the rise. Even in
the United States where “tepid” signs of a “devolution revolution”
remain firmly tied to judicial interpretation, a growing number of legis-
lators appear to endorse the view that federalism “can move in a more
state-friendly direction without constitutional change” (Kincaid, 1999a:
141, 150). 
In some other federations, the signs of a return to an older and more
confederal tradition and understanding of federalism are in evidence much
more clearly. Canadian federalism in particular saw a dramatic turnabout
in the last two decades of the twentieth century. One of the most success-
ful textbooks on Canadian federalism could denounce the very idea of the
provinces as equal partners to the federal government as an “unprece-
dented betrayal of the national interest” (Stevenson, 1982: preface).
Twenty years later, such equality is celebrated as the wisdom of a new col-
laborative federalism. Intergovernmental treaties or accords are meant to
replace the haggling over constitutional rights. They would identify
national policy objectives and establish procedural rules of collaboration,
including mechanisms of mediation and dispute settlement (the subject
matter here is the Social Union Framework Agreement of 1999; see
Simeon and Cameron, 2002). Clearly, and despite the fact that most of this
is still at the stage of intentions, the age of disallowance and supremacy is
over in Canadian federalism.
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In Belgium, formally a federal state since 1993, a constitutional
attempt has been made to distinguish between territorial and cultural com-
munities. The constitution recognizes three territorial regions: Wallonia,
Flanders and Brussels-Capital, as well as three cultural communities:
French, Flemish and German, each with elected self-governing bodies and
distinct sets of powers. More importantly, perhaps, the constitution does
not attempt to allocate powers with juridical finality. Instead it provides for
extensive mechanisms of co-operation, concertation  and arbitration
(Senelle, 1996).
And, finally, there is the European Union. It has already been
described as a novel form of “confederal federalism” (Kincaid, 1999b) or
“confederal consociation” (Chryssochoou, 1994). Such characterizations
are called for because the EU has established impressive levels of supra-
national law and regulation while remaining committed to ongoing treaty
negotiations and a general search for consensus. In particular, however, it
is the often-belittled principle of subsidiarity that stands out as the most
innovative feature of European governance (Follesdal, 1998). More than
a mere admonition to make decisions at the lowest level possible, it
obliges all participants to reach negotiated agreements about what that
entails “by reason of the scale or the effects of the proposed action.” As
in the Althusian scheme of power allocation, this stipulation provides an
open-ended approach to the organization of divided governance (there is
evidence that Althusius played a role in finding the subsidiarity formula
of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty; see Endo, 1994). In principle, the Com-
munity12 can become active in any policy field deemed necessary, pro-
viding general standards and framework regulations, but it has to leave
most of the material regulation and programme implementation  to the
member states.
It remains to be seen whether these (and other) elements of treaty
federalism can become the building blocs for a new model of federal-
ism. Thus far, the collaborative federalism in Canada has failed to
include Quebec, the Belgian recognition of cultural communities has
done little to ease tensions and, given its ever expanding membership,
the European Union may still opt for firmer constitutional grounds.
However, it seems unlikely that any of these three polities will ever
return to the constitutional certainties of the American model. A glob-
alizing world will likewise have to find flexible forms of multilevel
governance that are both efficient and accountable. Therefore, as long
as the history of political thought is still recognized as a heuristic tool
of guidance, for the intellectual explorer as well as for the political engi-
neer, it remains important to advance awareness of historical crossroads
and alternatives.
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Notes
1 Since this is the edition the American Federalists used, I am not using the original
French text of 1748.
2 “Juris hujus regnis statuendi & se obligandi ad id, potestatem populus, seu membra
regni consociata habent…non singulis, sed conjunctim universis membris…com-
petit…communi consensu de illo disponere & constituere possunt, & quod semel dis-
posuerunt, id servare & praestare tenentur, nisi communi voluntate aliud placeat. Nam
ut se habet totum totum corpus ad singulos cives, atque ut totum corpus cuilibet mem-
bro imperare idque cohibere & regere potest, ita populus cuilibet civi imperat” (Althu-
sius, 1614: IX, 16-18).
3 “Summa cura legis fundamentalis regni, habenda est...nihil aliud, quam pacta quaedam,
sub quibus plures civitates & provinciae coierunt & consenserunt in unam eandemque
Rempubl. habendam & defendam communi opera, consilio & auxilio.” (XIX.49). 
4 Althusius suggests a kind of council system of representation whereby the legislative
body at each level of consociation is composed of the representatives of the next lower
level. See the next section.
5 Already John Locke had defined the federative power as pertaining to external affairs,
and he had explained the difference by referring to the political organization of Amer-
ica’s native peoples where the chiefs assume supremacy only in times of war (see Sec-
ond Treatise [1690], 146 and 108).
6 Still today, this is what distinguishes the German Bundesrat from the American Senate.
While the representatives in the latter receive their mandate from popular election in
the states, the members of the former are representatives of the Länder governments.
7 Of course he had a somewhat selective view of such interests. Women as a gender-spe-
cific community and non-Christian minorities had little chance of being included. But
in his principled approach he did go beyond the practice of his time by asserting that
there was no reason to exclude individual women from public office, for instance, or
by including agrarian interests in his representative scheme.
8 This simplification may be allowed for comparative purposes; a more differentiated
analysis of the Canadian case can be found in Simeon and Robinson, 1990: 19-30.
9 Althusius refers to this formula twice, verbatim, in his discussion of decision making
in guilds and colleges, Politica IV.20 (“quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus…approbari
debet”), and, modified in a reference to the representative purpose of universal coun-
cils, Politica XVII.60, where he says that what touches all, should also, and in fairness,
be acted upon by all (“quod omnis tangit, ab omnibus etiam peragi aequum est”).
10 Based on the record of notoriously partisan 5-4 Supreme Court decisions, some now
speak of “judicial federalism” in the United States; see Kincaid, 1999a: 150-53.
11 As exactly the kind of “council” that Madison was opposed to so vehemently, the upper
legislative chamber, the Bundesrat, is composed of ex officio members of the Länder
governments who have equal powers over most important legislative acts. 
12 The Maastricht Treaty established three so-called pillars for the EU, the supranational
European Community (EC), mostly governed by qualified majority voting, as well a
pillar for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and one for justice and home
affairs (JHA), both intergovernmental in nature.
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